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Abstract
This paper reassesses the impact of in°ation on long-term growth for a panel
of 14 EU countries. While previous research focuses on a linear nexus or allows
for a piecewise linear relationship with one single threshold, we take account of
a more complex relationship. We use a theoretical framework that allows for an
explicit distinction between level and growth e®ects of in°ation. The empirical
estimates for the full EU sample con¯rm the hypothesis that the relationship
between in°ation and growth is positive for very low in°ation rates (i.e. below
an estimate of 1.6%), insigni¯cant thereafter and negative for high, two-digit
in°ation levels. The estimate of the in°ation level that divides the insigni¯cant
from the negative e®ect is found to be higher in the group of traditional cohesion
countries than for the rest of the sample.
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11 Introduction
Today there seem to be some facts about in°ation that most economists and politi-
cians would accept without further arguing: (a) Very high in°ation rates are bad
for economic growth. (b) De°ation, de¯ned as a continuous fall of the overall price
level over a sustained period of time, can be harmful for the economy. (c) Between
these two extreme cases there is something like an optimal level or an optimal range
of in°ation. With the aim of avoiding the negative e®ects of too high as well as too
low in°ation rates almost all independent central banks pursue either direct in°ation
targets or have an explicit de¯nition of price stability solidly embedded into their
monetary policy strategy. At the same time also other national economic policy
authorities monitor in°ation developments carefully and take the consequences on
in°ation into account when designing economic policy measures.
While the negative e®ects of \extreme" in°ation rates seem to be common sense it
is far less clear what speci¯c levels of in°ation are to be considered as too low or
too high. The welfare costs of suboptimal in°ation come through various channels
and depending on which of these are the research focus, di®erent implications may
emerge for in°ation policy.
The welfare costs of high in°ation are manifold: First, both in°ation and de°ation
can be costly because of the distortionary impact on relative prices and thus the
e±ciency of market allocations. Second, the interaction of nominal price and wage
rigidities with both in°ation or de°ation may entail welfare costs. Examples are
menu costs (small ¯xed costs for changing prices or wages) or nominal lock-in (sell-
ers inability to modify listed prices in certain periods). Third, in°ation signi¯cantly
exacerbates the ine±ciencies caused by the tax system. Fourth, there are direct
transaction costs from in°ation in the form of shoe-leather costs (losses in consumer
surplus from holding real balances) or the over-development of the ¯nancial system
and the corresponding withdrawal of funds from other more e±cient investments.
Finally, in the absence of in°ation-indexed contracts, both in°ation and de°ation
have an e®ect on the income distribution in the economy.1
The analysis of the costs of in°ation in terms of welfare is usually done on a par-
tial basis. It is therefore di±cult to estimate the overall e®ect, not only because it
proves di±cult to identify and distinguish the various channels but also because of
overlapping of e®ects. In general, the literature suggests that even moderate rates
of in°ation are likely to entail signi¯cant welfare losses.
1For an extensive overview on these channels, see e.g. Camba-Mendez et al. (2003).
2The purpose of this paper is to focus on one speci¯c welfare channel: the e®ect
of in°ation on long-term growth. There is a wealth of empirical literature on the
relationship between in°ation and long-term growth, and it varies considerably with
respect to the theoretical foundation or the econometric speci¯cation. Starting from
simple linear models, the focus shifted in recent years towards non-linear speci¯-
cations in acknowledgement of the potentially more complex nature of the nexus.
Section 2 provides an extensive overview of the theoretical arguments as well as the
existing empirical literature.
These earlier studies provide the starting point for our assessment of the in°ation-
growth relationship. Focusing on the countries of the European Union as of January
2004, we aim at reassessing the impact of in°ation on long-term growth, putting
special emphasis on the theoretical arguments that point at the growth-harming
e®ects of very high as well as very low (or negative) in°ation rates. As compared
with the previous literature, our study deviates in several substantial respects.
While in most studies on the in°ation-growth nexus the estimation is based on ad
hoc regressions, we explicitly make use of a fully speci¯ed theoretical framework.
This approach is in response to the common criticism of a somewhat arbitrary
choice of explanatory factors for growth. It is especially relevant as Levine and
Renelt (1992), Levine and Zervos (1993) and Sala-i-Martin (1997), for linear mod-
els, and Crespo Cuaresma (2002), for non-linear models, found the cross-section
in°ation-growth relationship to be exceptionally fragile. Basing our estimation on a
theoretical framework therefore reduces the risk that the results re°ect data-mining.
Earlier studies usually allow for a single breakpoint in the growth-in°ation nexus,
which appears to us to be an oversimpli¯cation of the story. Based on the theoret-
ical arguments summarized in Section 2, one could expect a parabolic or trapezoid
shape of the curve: a positive link for very low or negative levels of in°ation, an
insigni¯cant relationship thereafter, followed by a negative impact of in°ation on
growth for excessively high in°ation. In order to test for this hypothesis we will
allow for more than one breakpoint in the relationship. We will furthermore also
account for the fact that the in°ation-growth nexus may di®er between countries in
a catching-up process and countries in a more advanced stage of development.
Usually studies abstract from the question whether the impact of in°ation on growth
takes the form of a level or a growth e®ect. A negative growth e®ect implies that a
permanently higher rate of in°ation does also permanently dampen growth. A level
e®ect, on the other hand, harms growth during a transition period while steady
state growth is left una®ected. The implications in terms of interpretation are fun-
3damentally di®erent. Notwithstanding the di±culty of di®erentiating these e®ects
empirically, we will explicitly take this issue into account and test for the existence
of level and growth e®ects on long-term growth.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an extensive overview of the
theoretical arguments as well as the existing empirical literature on the in°ation-
growth relationship. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework. Section 4 reports
about the empirical implementation of the model, starting with a linear framework
and allowing then for non-linear e®ects of a di®erent form (quadratic speci¯cation
and spline model). Section 4.4 elaborates on the growth versus level e®ect issue in
more detail. Section 5 concludes. Details on the data can be found in the Annex.
2 The theory and empirics of the in°ation-growth nexus
From a theoretical point of view, one has to distinguish between the short-run and
the long-run link between in°ation and growth. In the short run, faster economic
growth may be associated with more rapid in°ation when aggregate demand exceeds
aggregate supply and output cannot fully adjust. Short-term in°ation dynamics are
therefore mostly associated with the demand side of the economy.
In the long run, however, a signi¯cant in°uence of in°ation on growth for high levels
of in°ation will most probably be related to supply side e®ects, more speci¯cally to
misallocation of resources that distort investment and consumption. Common argu-
ments refer to either the average rate of in°ation or to the variability and uncertainty
of in°ation: menu costs, search costs, transaction costs due to the declining infor-
mation value of prices, the costs of economizing on holdings of non-interest-bearing
money, the social costs of increased uncertainty, the vicious cycle of a wage-price
spiral, etc. Very high in°ation rates tend to be also more volatile, making the real
returns on investments harder to forecast with subsequent consequences for savings
and investment decisions. With in°ation increasing even further, the widespread
use of indexation systems makes it more di±cult to reduce in°ation in the future.
At some point, ¯nally, money may lose its role as a medium of exchange and store
of value.2
While high in°ation is obviously associated with considerable costs and risks, de°a-
tion can be at least as dangerous. The most common argument refers to in°ation as
the \grease of the economy." Under wage and price rigidities only a certain level of in-
°ation guarantees a smooth adjustment of relative prices. The other risk associated
2For a literature survey, see e.g. Briault (1995).
4with sustained periods of de°ation is known as \the zero lower bound constraint":
If de°ation occurs while the economy is in a recession monetary authorities may
¯nd themselves in a situation where the key interest rates are (almost) zero while
real interest rates are still positive. In such a situation the most powerful mone-
tary policy instrument has lost its power. Finding the appropriate mix of the other
available monetary and economic instruments is a tricky task, as the experience of
Japan over the last decade showed.
Under the assumption that a very low in°ation level is associated with an increased
risk of subsequent de°ationary periods, one could expect a positive relationship be-
tween in°ation and growth also for positive, but small increases in the price level.
It is furthermore a commonly accepted fact that the measurement error in o±-
cial in°ation series due to the omission of quality improvements can be substantial,
speci¯cally if the measures don't follow the hedonic pricing approach. In this case
a small positive o±cial in°ation rate may in reality mask a falling price level. But
there are at least two more arguments pointing to a positive growth-in°ation link
for relatively low in°ation levels. The Mundell-Tobin e®ect describes a situation
when increases in in°ation force agents to shift their portfolio allocation away from
holdings of real balances into capital investment, which results in higher levels of
economic activity. Stockmann (1981), on the other hand, advances models where
money and capital are considered as complements.
Summarizing these theoretical arguments, one could expect a positive impact of
in°ation on growth for lower levels of in°ation (or de°ation), followed by a \grey
area" with no signi¯cant e®ect whatsoever. This range need not necessarily indicate
the lack of any e®ects of in°ation on growth but would rather represent an overlap
of various e®ects in di®erent direction. For excessive in°ation ¯nally the e®ect can
be expected to be signi¯cantly negative. A look at the empirical literature reveals
that the evidence for these hypotheses has undergone several phases with signi¯cant
changes.
During the 1950s and 1960s, when periods of excessive in°ation were basically un-
known within the group of industrialized countries, empirical tests on the growth-
hampering impact of in°ation tended to fail to show any clear-cut e®ect. The re-
lationship between long-term growth and in°ation was found to be insigni¯cant, in
some cases even positive (see e.g. Wai, 1959, Bhatia, 1960, or Dorrance, 1966).
With the two ¯rst oil price shocks and the emergence in many countries of severe
periods of high and persistent in°ation rates the evidence shifted. The e®ect was
now usually found to be signi¯cantly negative, although highly dependent on the
5inclusion of post-1970 and therefore high in°ation observations.3
It was only in the second half of the 1990s that the focus increasingly shifted to
the issue of possible nonlinearities in the growth-in°ation nexus. Acknowledging the
existence of a structural break in the relationship could explain the lack of evidence
for a signi¯cant negative e®ect in the pre-oil crisis period due to the lack of episodes
with high in°ation. Disregarding this break furthermore implies an underestimation
of the growth-hampering e®ect of very high in°ation levels. An estimated break-
point in the growth-in°ation nexus ¯nally suggests a speci¯c policy advice from a
growth perspective, namely to aim at keeping in°ation below the breakpoint level.
The recent literature reveals two major ¯ndings: (a) The nonlinearities in the e®ect
of in°ation on long-term growth are now widely acknowledged. (b) The estimates
of the optimal level of in°ation vary substantially between studies. The di®erences
stem on the one hand from the fact that the sample of countries varies consider-
ably, some of them covering industrialized countries only (Motley, 1998, Tsionas and
Christopoulos, 2003), some including also transition or developing countries (Sarel,
1996, Gosh and Phillips, 1998, Christo®ersen and Doyle, 1998, Khan and Senhadji,
2001). On the other hand, some studies { especially the earlier ones { do not ex-
plicitly estimate the breakpoint in°ation level but set it exogenously. Bruno and
Easterly (1998), for example, check for growth e®ects of in°ation below and above
40%, their lower bound de¯nition of an in°ation crisis.
It was only with the development of more sophisticated econometric techniques, that
the breakpoints were actually estimated. Applying the threshold panel data estima-
tion technique (based on the methodology developed by Hansen, 1999) and using a
panel of 140 countries and 39 years of data Khan and Senhadji (2001) estimate the
threshold in°ation level at 1-3% for industrial countries and at 11-12% for develop-
ing countries. Above these thresholds they ¯nd a negative and signi¯cant impact of
in°ation on growth, below the thresholds the relationship is positive and only signif-
icant for the industrial countries. The higher estimates for developing countries are
partially explained by the widespread use of indexation systems that reduce the ad-
verse e®ects of in°ation. It can also be assumed that the in°ation tolerance increases
if the high in°ation rates are related to the convergence process and the Balassa-
Samuelson e®ect, which are of higher relevance for developing countries. Using a
smooth transition model for a set of 15 EU countries, Tsionas and Christopoulos
(2003) ¯nd a negative relation between in°ation and growth throughout the sample;
3For a detailed study on this relationship, see e.g. Fischer (1993) or Barro (1995); for a model-
based estimation, see Motley (1998); for more recent evidence on European countries, see e.g.
Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2003). Temple (2000) o®ers an excellent critical survey on the empirical
literature on the in°ation-growth link.
6the e®ect is, however, three times as large in the high in°ation regime (above an
estimated threshold of 4.3%) than in the range below this threshold level.
In terms of data sample and threshold estimation methodology these two pieces of
research are comparable to our study. However { in contrast to their approach {
our econometric speci¯cation directly relates to economic theory. We will therefore
rely on a Hall and Jones (1999) type of production function in order to obtain the
empirically tractable model where furthermore growth and level e®ects can be dis-
tinguished. An important di®erence concerning the estimation technique is that not
only do we allow for a more complex non-linear structure but also impose continuity
in the relationship between in°ation and growth.
3 The theoretical framework
This section presents a human capital-augmented Solow model (Solow, 1956) where
in°ation is assumed to have an e®ect on the level of productivity of the economy.
In spite of its simplicity, the power of the Solow model in explaining the post-war
growth experience in both developed and developing countries is widely documented
in the literature dealing with the empirics of economic growth (see e.g. Mankiw et
al., 1992).
We will consider a simple human capital-augmented Solow model with a production
function as in Hall and Jones (1999). The production function is given by
Y (t) = K(t)® [A(t)H(t)]
1¡® ;
where K(t) is the stock of physical capital, H(t) denotes the human capital-augmented
labor force and A(t) is a measure of labor-augmenting productivity. The measure
of human capital augmented labor is given by
H(t) = G(E(t))L(t);
where G(E(t)) is a function mapping years of education (E(t)) to human capital
stock per worker and L(t) stands for the labor force. Following Hall and Jones
(1999), let G(E(t)) be given by4
G(E(t)) = exp[½E(t)];
4Based on empirical evidence on estimates of returns to schooling, Hall and Jones (1999) actually
assume the exponent in G(E(t)) to be a piecewise linear function, with a kink located at E(t) = 4.
Given that the education levels in our sample lie well above that value, we use a linear function for
the exponent in G(E(t)).
7for ½ > 0. Consider a speci¯cation of A(t), where in°ation may a®ect the level and
the growth rate of productivity,
A(t;¼(t)) = A(0)expfª(¼(t)) + [g + £(¼(t))]tg; (1)
where g > 0 is the growth of technology at zero in°ation and ª(¢) and £(¢) are arbi-
trary bounded functions. This speci¯cation nests those of Cozier and Selody (1994)
(corresponding to ª(¼(t);¾¼(t)) = ¹1¼(t) + ¹2¾¼(t), where ¾¼(t) is the volatility of
in°ation, and £(¼(t)) = 0), Motley (1998) (for £(¼(t)) = Á¼(t) and ª(¼(t)) = 0)
and Andr¶ es and Hernando (1997) (using both speci¯cations above).
Assume as in the usual textbook Solow model that the dynamics of physical capital
are given by
_ K(t) = sY (t) ¡ ±K(t);
where s 2 (0;1) is the (constant) fraction of output devoted to investment and ± is
the depreciation rate of physical capital. The equilibrium level of physical capital





n + _ A(t;¼(t))=A(t;¼(t)) + ±
¶1=(1¡®)
;
n being the rate of population growth. A ¯xed long-run level of in°ation ¼¤ will be




n + g + £(¼¤) + ±
¶1=(1¡®)
:
The adjustment to equilibrium for y(t) = Y (t)=(A(t)H(t)) is given by (see e.g.
Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992)
d[ln(y(t))]=dt = ¸[ln(y¤) ¡ ln(y(t))];
for y¤ = f(k¤) = (k¤)®. The parameter ¸ captures the speed of convergence to the
steady state. Consider the dynamic process for output per unit of e®ective labor
from period t to period t + ¿,
















8which can be written in terms of growth of income per capita as5
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We will proceed by estimating (2) under the assumption of a growth e®ect of in°ation
(and no level e®ect, that is, ª(¢) = 0), a level e®ect (and no growth e®ect, that is
£(¢) = 0) or assuming that in°ation can cause both types of e®ect.
4 In°ation and growth in Europe: An empirical analysis
4.1 First results: A linear growth-in°ation link?
In this section we will proceed by estimating several versions of (2) under di®erent
assumptions concerning the functional form of the growth and level e®ect of in°ation.
All estimations are done for a panel comprising 14 EU countries (all member states
as of January 2001 except for Luxembourg). The data sources are presented in the
appendix. We use data spanning the period 1960-99, divided into subperiods of
eight years. The growth variable on the left hand side of (2) is thus the growth rate
of income per capita in the corresponding eight years. A relatively low variability
is observed for the variable that proxies education attainment (average years of
education for an adult over 25 years old) within the countries in our sample. In order
to avoid multicollinearity, we assume that the changes in E(t) happen in a stepwise
fashion so that within a period E(t + ¿) = E(t). For the empirical implementation
of the model, the value will be set equal to the average educational attainment in
the period.6 The general speci¯cation which is estimated for di®erent assumptions
on the nature of ª(¢) and £(¢) is
5Note that the existence of a constant level of in°ation corresponding to the steady state in this
augmented Solow model is not a necessary assumption for the stability of the solution. As long as
the in°ation rate is generated by an ergodic stochastic process, the growth rate of GDP per capita
in the Solow steady state will remain in a bounded interval and the adjustment described above
will take place towards a non-constant equilibrium that depends on the in°ation rate in the period
considered.
6This assumption does not a®ect the results of the paper concerning the e®ect of in°ation on
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where ¹ Ei;t+¿ refers to the average educational attainment for country i in the period
ranging from t to t+¿, ¹ si;t+¿ is the average investment share and ¹ ni;t+¿ is the aver-
age population growth. The error term "i;t is assumed to be composed of a country
and a subperiod-speci¯c error, both treated as constant, and a general i.i.d. error
process, such that "i;t = ¹i + ·t + ºi;t with ºi;t » IID(0;¾2). Throughout the study
±, the depreciation rate, and g, the growth of technology corresponding to zero in°a-
tion, will be set equal to 3% and 2%, respectively, in line with Mankiw et al. (1992).7
Equation (3) has been estimated assuming di®erent e®ects of in°ation on labor-
augmenting productivity. The results presented in Table 1 and all later tables in-
clude a dummy for the last subperiod in the sample for Ireland. This was included
because the Jarque-Bera test for all speci¯cations strongly rejected the null hypoth-
esis of normal distribution of the residuals. This deviation of normality turned out
to be caused exclusively by the growth observation corresponding to Ireland in the
period 1992-99, which the model without dummy systematically tended to under-
predict. The estimated parameter for the dummy is positive and signi¯cant in all
speci¯cations.
The ¯rst column presents the results without the e®ect of in°ation, i.e. the struc-
tural parameter estimates from (3) setting £(¢) = ª(¢) = 0. 8 The estimates
of ¸ imply a convergence rate of approximately 10% per year, signi¯cantly higher
than the estimates usually obtained in cross-country studies. The ¯xed e®ects panel
setting allows for di®erent steady states across economies, and the estimate of the
7Changing the value of these parameters inside economically sensible ranges does not qualita-
tively a®ect the results presented in the paper.
8Given the low within-country variability of the education measure, the size and signi¯cance
of the estimate of ½ depends strongly on the inclusion of ¯xed subperiod e®ects. Results with
and without time dummies are available from the authors upon request. As the exclusion of a
variable with an insigni¯cant parameter estimate may still a®ect the other estimates, we also reran
all estimations for the model without human capital. None of the results presented in the paper
were signi¯cantly a®ected by the omission of the education variable.
10convergence rate thus refers to the convergence towards the country-speci¯c steady
state.9 The estimate of ® is in line with those reported by Mankiw et al. (1992), for
example, and the estimate of ½ is positive although insigni¯cant. This latter result
is due to the low variability of education measures for the sample analyzed both
across countries and through time.10
In a next step, we are going to let in°ation a®ect the labor-augmenting technology.
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of average in°ation versus the residuals of the estima-
tion presented in the ¯rst column of Table 1 (that is, without modelling the e®ect
of in°ation on growth) for the 14 EU countries and all subperiods. While from a
purely visual examination of the scatter plot a negative relationship between these
two variables only seems to be evident for high levels of in°ation, it is not possible
to draw robust inference before taking into account the speci¯cation of the struc-
tural model. The second and third columns in Table 1 present the results when a
linear growth and level e®ect of in°ation, respectively, is included. The £(¼(t)) and
ª(¼(t)) functions used were £(¼(t)) = µ¼(t);µ 2 I R, and ª(¼(t)) = Ã¼(t);Ã 2 I R.
For the growth e®ect speci¯cation the estimates reported approximate the long-run
in°ation level for each country using the subperiod average in°ation rate. Other
di®erent speci¯cations for ¼¤ have been tried, including the overall sample average,
or exogenously set in°ation rates ranging between 2% and 6%, without any qualita-
tive change in the results. The estimates of ¸, ® and ½ are practically not a®ected
by the inclusion of in°ation in the speci¯cation. The results in columns 2 and 3
show that the negative e®ect of in°ation on growth of GDP per capita appears only
marginally signi¯cant in the speci¯cation which allows exclusively for a growth e®ect
of in°ation.11
In order to account for the potential endogeneity of in°ation in (3), we also estimate
the level e®ect speci¯cation instrumenting the in°ation rate by the index of central
bank independence in Hall and Franzese (1998) and money supply growth.12 Using a
9The point estimate of the convergence rate using a common intercept is approximately 4%.
However, the null of equality of ¯xed e®ects is strongly rejected when performing the corresponding
F-test.
10The estimate of ½ corresponding to the model without time e®ects is 0.315, with a standard
deviation of 0.038, and thus highly signi¯cant.
11The results when including both e®ects simultaneously are very inconclusive for all the spec-
i¯cations in the paper and are therefore not reported. They are available from the authors upon
request. The main reason is that the identi¯cation of the structural parameters is basically done by
estimating the growth e®ect (the part of the speci¯cation in logs), which requires non-linear esti-
mation methods. This identi¯cation issue, together with a high degree of multicollinearity, renders
most of the in°ation e®ects insigni¯cant when the model is too parametrized, as is the case when
the level and growth e®ects are simultaneously assumed.
12The unrestricted level speci¯cation is used because it is linear in parameters and therefore
11speci¯cation such as (3) without the parameter constraints implied by the structural
model, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test gives clear evidence in favor of the use of least
square estimation.
4.2 Allowing for non-linear e®ects of in°ation on growth
Assuming a linear e®ect of in°ation on the level or growth rate of GDP per capita
may, however, be a wrong modelling strategy. If the e®ect of in°ation on growth is
of the non-linear type suggested by theoretical arguments as described in Section 2,
linear models would tend to underestimate its magnitude for high levels of in°ation.
Table 2 presents the results based on a quadratic speci¯cation of £(¼(t)) and
ª(¼(t)). The models with individual growth and level e®ects point towards a hump-
shaped relationship between in°ation and economic growth. The other structural
parameters remain practically unchanged by the inclusion of a quadratic speci¯ca-
tion of the growth-in°ation link.
Independently of the nature of the in°ation e®ect on growth, the estimates pre-
sented in Table 2 result in an extremely high estimate of the optimal (in the sense
of growth maximizing) level of in°ation. According to the results with a quadratic
growth speci¯cation, the European experience would imply that increases in the
in°ation rate for levels below 9% (8.5% for the level speci¯cation) have been ac-
companied by rising long-term growth rates of GDP per capita. However, this high
estimate could be due to the symmetry preimposed by the quadratic speci¯cation. If
the in°ation-growth link is positive for very low levels of price increase and negative
for high levels but the slope associated to these links di®ers, the estimate of the
optimal level of in°ation based on a model with a symmetric relationship between
in°ation and growth will be distorted.
A way to overcome this limitation and allow for model asymmetry in the relationship
between in°ation and growth would be to let £(¼(t)) and ª(¼(t)) be continuous
piecewise functions (so-called splines), where the parameter associated with the
in°ation rate is allowed to change discretely depending on the level of in°ation.
The theoretical discussion in the introduction and in Section 2 and the evidence
from the quadratic speci¯cation would call for the inclusion of a function with two
di®erentiability breakpoints, while preserving continuity. For the growth e®ect, the
function is de¯ned as
the usual asymptotics for instrumental variable estimation hold. There is little guidance in the
literature as to the properties of instrumental variable estimators with non-linearities such as the
ones arising in the speci¯cation with a growth e®ect. For the linear level e®ect case, the Sargan test





µ3¼(t) if ¼(t) > ¹2
µ2(¼(t) ¡ ¹2) + µ3¹2 if ¹1 < ¼(t) · ¹2
µ1(¼(t) ¡ ¹1) + µ2(¹1 ¡ ¹2) + µ3¹2 if ¼(t) · ¹1
(4)





Ã3¼(t) if ¼(t) > ´2
Ã2(¼(t) ¡ ´2) + Ã3´2 if ´1 < ¼(t) · ´2
Ã1(¼(t) ¡ ´1) + Ã2(´1 ¡ ´2) + Ã3´2 if ¼(t) · ´1
(5)
The breakpoints, ¹1 and ¹2 (or, alternatively, ´1 and ´2) will be treated as unknown
parameters and therefore estimated. Table 3 shows the estimates of the models
where the growth and level e®ects of in°ation are modelled by means of (4) and (5),
respectively. The estimation of the breakpoints for the case of a growth e®ect of
in°ation was done by choosing the values








^ ¸(~ ¹); ^ ®(~ ¹); ^ ½(~ ¹); ^ µ1(~ ¹); ^ µ2(~ ¹); ^ µ3(~ ¹)
´i2
;
where M is the set of those in°ation rates actually realized in the sample. The
estimates for (5) are obtained analogously. That is, the breakpoints were estimated
as the in°ation values that jointly minimize the sum of squared residuals among
those realized in the in°ation sample (the estimation was done after trimming 5%
of the extremes of the distribution of in°ation rates and ensuring that at least 10%
of the observations fall in the central regime). The results of the estimation for the
available data are presented in Table 3.
The likelihood ratio test statistics and their associated bootstrap p-value presented
in Table 3 correspond to a test for linearity computed in the spirit of Hansen (1996)
and Pesaran and Weeks (2001). The null hypothesis corresponds to the restriction
µ1 = µ2 = µ3 for the growth e®ect speci¯cation (Ã1 = Ã2 = Ã3 for the level e®ect
model). Under the null hypothesis of linearity the thresholds ¹1 and ¹2 (´1 and ´2)
are not identi¯ed, and standard test statistics therefore fail to converge to known
asymptotic distributions. Finding optimal tests in this setting is an issue that has
recently been widely studied in the econometric literature (see e.g. Andrews and
Ploberger, 1994, and Hansen, 1996). In order to compute the p-values presented
in Table 3, we follow a bootstrap procedure similar to that proposed by Hansen
(1996). Using the actual parameter estimates of the linear model corresponding to
the null hypothesis and drawing randomly from the residuals, we compute samples
of growth rates. A linear and a non-linear model with a spline e®ect of in°ation
on growth are ¯tted to the simulated data, and the corresponding likelihood ratio
13test statistic is computed. Repeating this procedure a large number of times allows
us to obtain an estimate of the distribution of the test statistic under the null of
linearity, and therefore an estimate of the p-value corresponding to the test statistic
computed with actual data. For the results presented, 500 replications of the proce-
dure were employed. In all cases, there is evidence of a non-linear e®ect of in°ation
on GDP per capita growth of the type modelled through the continuous piecewise
linear functions de¯ned above.
The results for the individual speci¯cations provide a very interesting insight into
the relationship between in°ation and growth in Europe for the period 1960-99.
Both for the level and the growth e®ect model, the estimate of the ¯rst break is
slightly higher than 1.6% (which corresponds approximately to the 10th percentile
of the distribution of in°ation in the pooled sample). Below this in°ation level we
¯nd a signi¯cantly positive link, indicating the potential risks of very low in°ation
and de°ation.
This area is followed by a wide range of in°ation rates that do not show a signi¯-
cant e®ect on long-term growth. This does not necessarily indicate that there are
no in°ation e®ects on the economy but rather masks the overlap of negative and
positive partial e®ects that results in an overall insigni¯cant net impact on long-
term growth. A signi¯cantly negative e®ect is { according to our estimation { only
observable for in°ation levels over 16.35%. As expected the absolute value of the
parameter estimate for the negatively sloped part is much higher than the estimates
implied by the linear model.
The estimated second threshold level of in°ation appears surprisingly high, especially
when compared to the previous literature. Several aspects have to be borne in mind
when interpreting this result. Firstly, previous papers impose a non-linear structure
that does not allow for more than one breakpoint, a model that proved inferior to
our more complex speci¯cation.13 If the °at middle part actually exists, such model
structures will tend to underestimate the negative slope for high in°ation rates and
the single threshold estimate will possess limited informational value. Secondly, the
estimate of the upper threshold for the full sample may be predominantly driven
by only a small subsample of countries for which high in°ation in earlier subperiods
of our sample is related to the catching-up process and therefore presumably less
harmful than for countries in a more advanced stage of economic development. This
13We also estimated models with a single breakpoint in the spline speci¯cation. These models pick
up exclusively the negative link for high in°ation rates, with an insigni¯cant parameter attached to
lower in°ation levels. Bootstrapped likelihood ratio tests give clear evidence of the superiority of
the speci¯cation with two breakpoints over the two-regime model.
14claim will be explicitly assessed below. Thirdly and related to the latter, it should
be emphasized that in°ation data points above 9% are characterized by high dis-
persion, so that the uncertainty surrounding the upper threshold estimate is high.
Actually the negatively sloped part of the relationship remains signi¯cant and higher
than the linear estimate if ¹2 and ´2, respectively, are reduced to values around 10%.
The uncertainty surrounding the threshold estimates can be illustrated by computed
con¯dence intervals for the thresholds, using a generalization of the procedure put
forward in Hansen (2000). In ¯xing one of the two estimated thresholds, a 90% con-
¯dence interval for the remaining threshold will be de¯ned as the (not necessarily
symmetric) neighborhood around the threshold value for which the null of a two-
regime model is rejected at the 10% signi¯cance level against a three-regime model.
Hansen (2000) recommends to use the asymptotic critical values for the likelihood
ratio test. Given that our threshold estimates tend to be close to the extremes of
the empirical distribution of in°ation, we will compute the con¯dence intervals us-
ing the bootstrap distribution of the likelihood ratio test, computed by means of
1000 replications. The alternative hypothesis in the computation of the bootstrap
distribution used in each case is the one corresponding to the least square three-
regime model. The resulting 90% con¯dence intervals for the lower threshold are
[1.40%, 1.75%] for the level e®ect speci¯cation and [0.64%, 2.05%] for the growth ef-
fect speci¯cation. The con¯dence intervals for the higher threshold are much larger,
spanning all values of in°ation which are realized in the sample exceeding 12.85% for
the level e®ect model, and all values higher than 13.15% for the growth e®ect model.
One may argue that the factors that can be made responsible for any e®ect of
in°ation on GDP per capita growth are not related to the current rate of in°ation,
but rather to in°ation expectations. For the case of the investment-hampering e®ect
of in°ation, the link is related to expected real rates of return to capital, which
may di®er from those which are actually realized. It could thus be the case that
the correlations obtained in our empirical analysis just re°ect growth responses to
unexpected in°ation shocks. As a robustness check for the results presented above,
we therefore reestimated the non-linear models substituting the in°ation data by
out-of-sample projections of ARIMA(1,1,0) models estimated on quarterly country-
speci¯c rates of in°ation.14 The estimates of the model with a non-linear growth
e®ect of in°ation do not change either qualitatively or quantitatively. For the case
of the level e®ect model, only the second threshold value falls down to 10.27% while
preserving the pattern of correlation that emerges with realized in°ation rates.
14Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests gave evidence of unit root nonstationarity for all quarterly in-
°ation series. Details on the estimation of the univariate time series models can be obtained from
the authors upon request.
154.3 In°ation, growth and cohesion countries
One possible explanation for the surprisingly high estimate for the upper threshold
is that the result is driven by a small subset of countries that show a common char-
acteristic in the in°ation-growth nexus and account for the majority of high in°ation
data points. A look at the underlying data for individual countries reveals that all
in°ation observations (8 year averages) of 13% and above in our sample relate to
Italy or one of the four classical cohesion economies Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain, and more than half of the in°ation observations of 7% and above refer to this
set of countries. There are good reasons to believe that economic growth in countries
in a catching-up process is less a®ected by high in°ation rates than in countries in
a more advanced stage of economic development.
A ¯rst factor is the Balassa-Samuelson e®ect, a common explanation for di®erences
in service prices. The basic idea is that of an economy with an open sector produc-
ing tradable goods and a closed sector producing nontradable goods. Given that
wages are assumed to be linked to labor productivity in the open sector and because
wages are expected to equalize across sectors, the price level of the closed sector is
determined by the productivity level prevailing in the open sector. In catching-up
economies, productivity growth tends to be signi¯cantly higher in the open sector
so that unit labor costs and thus also prices will consequently increase faster in the
closed sector (see, for example, De Gregorio et al., 1994). This implies that in°ation
rates will be higher the more pronounced productivity di®erentials are between sec-
tors in any country. The literature survey in ¶ Egert et al. (2004) collects estimates
for that part of in°ation that can directly be related to the Balassa-Samuelson with
data samples covered by the di®erent papers ranging from 1960 to 2002. For Ireland
the average estimate is 2.6%, for Spain 1.9%, for Italy and Greece it is 1.9 and 1.7%
respectively and for Portugal the estimate is as low as 0.8% (see also De Grauwe
and Skudelny, 2002). This indicates that a fraction of in°ation rates is accounted
for by the Balassa-Samuelson e®ect and can thus be assumed to soften the growth
harming e®ect of high in°ation.
A second factor speci¯c to countries in a catching-up process is the gradual adjust-
ment of administrated prices { such as prices for public services, rents or utilities
services { to the market level. In most cases such price adjustments remain without
signi¯cant second round e®ects so that they may bias in°ation upwards without
corresponding negative consequences for growth (see e.g. MacDonald and W¶ ojcik,
2004). A general phenomenon of catching-up economies is that in°ation often re-
°ects the pass-through of costs related to substantial modernization in the capital
stock and not or to a lesser extent a pass-through of increased wage costs. As
this implies that in°ation goes along with an increase in the growth potential, the
16negative e®ects of in°ation can be assumed to be of smaller magnitude. A further
factor of relevance may be the upward bias of o±cial in°ation measures due to the
omission of quality improvements, speci¯cally if not calculated based on the hedonic
pricing approach. This factor has been shown to be of higher relevance for countries
in a catching-up process (see e.g. Ito et al., 1997, for Asian countries or ¶ Egert and
Lommatzsch, 2003, for Central and Eastern European countries) and therefore again
accounts for a part of in°ation without corresponding negative e®ects on growth.
A ¯nal argument relates to exchange rate policies. To various degrees all of the
catching-up economies in our sample used exchange rate devaluations to improve
their competitiveness, as suggested by the evolution of the nominal e®ective ex-
change rate over our sample period. In this case the negative e®ects of the increase
in imported in°ation including the costs of possible second round e®ects will be
compensated at least partially by the positive growth e®ects of the gain in compet-
itiveness so that the overall e®ect of high in°ation on growth will be weakened.
All these factors can be expected to increase the in°ation tolerance in countries in a
catching-up process. In this case the past high in°ation experiences in those coun-
tries may bias our estimates of the upper threshold of the spline function. In order
to directly assess this potential source of country heterogeneity we reestimated the
models ¯xing the lower threshold and allowing for di®erent high in°ation thresholds
for the traditional cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and the
rest of the countries in our sample. The results are presented in Table 4, with the
parameters which are speci¯c to the cohesion group denoted by the subindex c, and
those for the rest of the sample denoted by the subindex nc. The general shape
of the relationship remains robust when we allow for di®erent upper thresholds in
the two groups of countries, with an insigni¯cant medium regime and a signi¯cant
negative parameter attached to in°ation in the upper in°ation regime. The slopes of
the regimes with a negative e®ect do furthermore not appear signi¯cantly di®erent
across groups of countries when tested by means of an F-test.
The estimated upper thresholds, however, con¯rm the hypothesis of a higher in-
°ation tolerance in catching-up economies. For the country subsample containing
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain the estimate of the second kink in the spline,
that is the in°ation level beyond which the e®ect of in°ation on growth is negative,
is signi¯cantly higher than for the rest of the sample. It furthermore corresponds
to the estimated upper threshold of the full sample estimation (16.35%), indicating
the dominance of the cohesion country experience for the overall sample. For the
subset of non-cohesion countries the upper threshold is now estimated at around 8%
in°ation rates. The rest of the parameter estimates in the model are not signi¯cantly
17a®ected by the inclusion of a group-speci¯c upper threshold in the spline.
To sum up, estimation results for the full sample with non-linear models support
our hypothesis of a more complex structure of the in°ation-growth relationship. For
very low or negative in°ation rates there is a positive link so that further disin°a-
tion would have negative marginal growth e®ects. The spline model speci¯cation
furthermore suggests that very high in°ation rates (over an estimate of around 16%)
are a major threat to growth. Between these extremes there is a range of in°ation
levels that show no signi¯cant e®ect on growth, suggesting an overlap of positive
and negative partial e®ects. The estimate of the level of in°ation that triggers the
negative e®ect seems to be driven primarily by the subset of cohesion countries.
The threshold estimate for the group of non-cohesion countries appears much lower
(around 8%).
4.4 A level or a growth e®ect of in°ation in Europe?
The results presented above give evidence that extremely low and extremely high
levels of in°ation are related to bad growth experiences for the analyzed sample
of European countries. For the model with a spline function, the result emerges
independently of whether a growth or a level e®ect of in°ation is assumed in the
underlying speci¯cation. Is there, however, evidence that one of these two speci¯-
cations explains the growth experience in the EU better than the other? According
to model selection criteria, and concentrating on the full sample results presented
in Table 3, the model with a growth e®ect performs marginally better than the
model with a level e®ect. The adjusted R2 of the model with a growth e®ect is
0.803 (and thus the highest of all estimated models) against a value of 0.800 for
the level e®ect speci¯cation. Consequently, as both models have the same number
of parameters, the AIC and Schwarz criteria of the model with a growth e®ect are
marginally smaller than those of the model with a level e®ect of in°ation. A scien-
tist led by model selection criteria would then be inclined to choose the model with
a positive growth e®ect of in°ation occurring at very low levels of in°ation and a
negative growth e®ect for very high levels.
Another approach to deciding upon the superiority of one of the model speci¯ca-
tions is to perform a statistical test. We would then be interested in whether the
explanation of the link between in°ation and growth postulated by the model with
a growth e®ect implies, for the data at hand, a signi¯cant improvement (in the clas-
sical statistic testing sense) over the level e®ect model. If both approaches lead to
the same ranking of models, our conclusion on the nature of the link studied would
be strengthened. While model selection criteria (such as AIC and Schwarz criterion)
treat all competing models in a symmetric fashion, the classical statistical testing
18paradigm gives more weight to one of the two alternatives (the null hypothesis) and
searches for signi¯cant evidence of departure from it. As opposed to model selec-
tion criteria, hypothesis testing need not lead to a de¯nite answer concerning the
preferred model for the data at hand.
The models to be compared are not nested, so the usual likelihood ratio test statistic
does not have the standard Â2 asymptotic distribution. In order to obtain the dis-
tribution of the likelihood ratio test statistic under the null hypothesis, a nonpivotal
bootstrapping method similar to the one explained above for the linearity test can
be used (see Pesaran and Weeks, 2001). Samples of GDP per capita growth are gen-
erated from the ¯tted model corresponding to the null hypothesis by using random
draws from its residuals, both models corresponding to the null and the alternative
hypothesis are estimated and the likelihood ratio test statistic is computed. This is
repeated a large enough number of times, and by comparing the original test statis-
tic with the empirical distribution of likelihood ratio test statistics resulting from
the replications, a bootstrap estimate of the p-value can be obtained.
The model with a piecewise linear level e®ect of in°ation can be considered more
parsimonious than the model with a growth e®ect, and given that its explanatory
power is marginally lower than that of the latter, it is the natural candidate for
the null hypothesis. The likelihood ratio test statistic corresponding to the test of
a level against a growth e®ect equals 1.09, and the estimated bootstrap p-value is
0.18, obtained with 500 replications. While the result of this test does not give
signi¯cant support to the growth e®ect model, the test carried out with the growth
e®ect as the null hypothesis does not signi¯cantly support the level e®ect model
either. As opposed to the conclusion reached by using model selection criteria, non-
nested model testing does not o®er a de¯nite answer about the dominance of one
speci¯cation over the other, deeming both of them observationally equivalent.
5 Conclusions
The paper reassesses the impact of in°ation on long-term growth for a panel of 14
EU countries. While previous research focuses on a linear nexus or allows for a
piecewise linear relationship with one single threshold, we allow for a more complex
relationship. Theoretical arguments point to a positive relationship between in°a-
tion and growth for very low or negative levels of in°ation, followed possibly by a
range of no signi¯cant e®ect. For very high in°ation rates the impact on growth can
be expected to become negative. These arguments suggest hypothesizing a trape-
zoid type of relationship between in°ation and long-term growth.
19We present a simple theoretical framework { based on the basic human capital-
augmented Solow model with a production function as in Hall and Jones (1999)
{ that allows for an explicit empirical distinction between level and growth e®ects
of in°ation. The empirical estimates con¯rm the hypothesis that the relationship
between in°ation and growth is of a non-linear nature and that one threshold may
not be enough to account for the nonlinearities. We ¯nd a signi¯cant positive slope
for levels of in°ation below an estimated value of around 1.6%, giving support to
the \grease of the economy" and \zero lower bound constraint"-type of arguments
as suggested in the literature. While these results support the growth-harming con-
sequences of de°ation we can, however, not directly conclude on the adverse growth
e®ects of low levels of in°ation without taking the potential quality improvement-
related measurement errors contained in the o±cial in°ation series into account.
The positively sloped area is followed by a range of in°ation rates where no sig-
ni¯cant e®ect on growth prevails. For the full sample estimations, this interval is
surprisingly wide, with around three quarters of the observations falling within this
area. The second threshold beyond which we observe the expected negative impact
of in°ation on growth is subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty due to the
wide dispersion of high in°ation observations. Our estimate of around 16% seems to
be strongly a®ected by the convergence process of catching-up countries. Arguments
for a higher in°ation resistance in those countries relate to the Balassa-Samuelson
e®ect, to the role of administrated price adjustments or measurement bias for in-
°ation or to exchange rate policies. If we estimate di®erent upper thresholds for
traditional cohesion countries and the rest of the sample, the estimate for the sam-
ple comprising Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain remains around 16%, while the
threshold estimate for the rest of the countries is around 8%. Compared with the
models that allow for only one single threshold, our negative slope for high levels of
in°ation is signi¯cantly steeper. While the growth e®ect model explains the data
marginally better than the level e®ect, non-nested model testing does not give evi-
dence of the superiority of one of the models.
Our ¯ndings support the intuition of the detrimental growth e®ects of very low
(or negative) and excessively high rates of in°ation. They should, however, not be
blindly interpreted as giving direct advice for current economic policy. First, the
negative e®ects of in°ation go far beyond the pure growth e®ects, ranging from
distributional aspects to social costs and related welfare e®ects. Depending on the
priorities of economic policy speci¯c costs of suboptimal in°ation may be in the core
of interest. Second, almost all high in°ation observations (of 8% and above) date
20 years back and therefore fall within a period of global shocks, lower economic
integration and high catching-up related in°ation components. This implies that
20especially the upper threshold level of in°ation may be of limited relevance for
current economic policy, especially taking into account that the sample of cohesion
countries have caught up considerably with the rest of the European economies
during the period studied.
Appendix: Data sources
- GDP per capita: Penn World Tables 6.1; Heston, Summers and Aten (2002).
- Share of investment over GDP: Penn World Tables 6.1; Heston, Summers and
Aten (2002).
- Population growth: Penn World Tables 6.1; Heston, Summers and Aten (2002).
- Education: average years of education of an adult over 25 years old; corrected
Barro and Lee (2001) data set by de la Fuente and Domenech (2002).
- In°ation rate: CPI in°ation, averages from quarterly data, International Fi-
nancial Statistics, IMF.
- Money supply growth: AMECO Database, European Commission.
- Central bank independence index: Hall and Franzese (1998).
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25Table 1: Linear growth and level e®ect of in°ation
Parameter No in°ation e®ect Growth e®ect Level e®ect
£(¼(t) = µ¼(t) ª(¼(t) = Ã¼(t)
¸ 0.100¤¤¤(0.023) 0.094¤¤¤(0.026) 0.094¤¤¤(0.027)
® 0.403¤¤¤(0.067) 0.379¤¤¤(0.077) 0.379¤¤¤(0.078)
½ 0.047 (0.056) 0.035 (0.079) 0.045 (0.079)
µ { -0.016¤(0.009) {
Ã { { -0.324 (0.211)
Obs. 68 68 68
¹ R2 0.77 0.78 0.77
JB test 0.02 0.32 0.10
¤¤¤(¤¤)[¤] stands for 1% (5%) [10%] signi¯cant. White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in
parenthesis. Least square dummy variable estimation used in all cases, and non-linear least square
dummy variable estimation used when a growth e®ect of in°ation is parametrized. Subperiod
dummies used if jointly signi¯cant. Estimates based on a panel of eight-year averages for the period
1960{99. Dummy for Ireland in the period 1992-99 included and highly signi¯cant in all cases.
26Table 2: Quadratic growth and level e®ect of in°ation
Parameter Growth e®ect Level e®ect
£(¼(t) = µ1¼(t) + µ2¼(t)2 ª(¼(t) = Ã1¼(t) + Ã2¼(t)2
¸ 0.088¤¤¤(0.027) 0.089¤¤¤(0.028)
® 0.392¤¤¤(0.075) 0.383¤¤¤(0.075)
½ 0.050 (0.071) 0.042 (0.070)
µ1 0.030¤(0.017) {
µ2 -0.165¤¤¤(0.058) {
Ã1 { 0.659 (0.481)
Ã2 { -3.505¤¤(1.529)
Obs. 68 68
¹ R2 0.79 0.79
JB test 1.41 1.82
¤¤¤(¤¤)[¤] stands for 1% (5%) [10%] signi¯cant. White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in
parenthesis. Least square dummy variable estimation used in all cases, and non-linear least square
dummy variable estimation used when a growth e®ect of in°ation is parametrized. Subperiod
dummies used if jointly signi¯cant. Estimates based on a panel of eight-year averages for the period
1960{99. Dummy for Ireland in the period 1992-99 included and highly signi¯cant in all cases.
27Table 3: Growth and level e®ect of in°ation: Spline speci¯cation
Parameter Growth e®ect Level e®ect
£(¼(t)) as in (4) ª(¼(t)) as in (5)
¸ 0.092¤¤¤(0.027) 0.098¤¤¤(0.028)
® 0.366¤¤¤(0.071) 0.359¤¤¤(0.071)
½ 0.055 (0.067) 0.047 (0.062)
µ1 0.153¤¤¤(0.053) {
µ2 0.004 (0.011) {
µ3 -0.049¤¤(0.020) {
Ã1 { 4.754¤¤¤(2.039)







¹ R2 0.80 0.80
JB test 1.29 1.49
LR test 12.84 12.01
(p-value) 0.035 0.046
¤¤¤(¤¤)[¤] stands for 1% (5%) [10%] signi¯cant. White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in
parenthesis. Least square dummy variable estimation used in all cases, and non-linear least square
dummy variable estimation used when a growth e®ect of in°ation is parametrized. Subperiod
dummies used if jointly signi¯cant. Estimates based on a panel of eight-year averages for the period
1960{99. Dummy for Ireland in the period 1992-99 included and highly signi¯cant in all cases.
The LR test statistic and its bootstrap p-value correspond to the linearity test proposed by Hansen
(1996). The bootstrap was done using 500 replications.
28Table 4: Cohesion versus non-cohesion countries
Parameter Growth e®ect Level e®ect
£(¼(t)) as in (4) ª(¼(t)) as in (5)
¸ 0.080¤¤¤(0.025) 0.098¤¤¤(0.029)
® 0.429¤¤¤(0.069) 0.374¤¤¤(0.075)
½ 0.062 (0.075) 0.045 (0.061)
µ1 0.162¤¤¤(0.056) {
µ2;c 0.003 (0.008) {
µ3;c -0.037¤(0.020) {
µ2;nc 0.021 (0.021) {
µ3;nc -0.038¤¤(0.013) {
Ã1 { 4.834¤¤(2.161)
Ã2;c { 0.237 (0.265)
Ã3;c { -1.053¤(0.589)









¹ R2 0.80 0.80
JB test 0.55 0.75
¤¤¤(¤¤)[¤] stands for 1% (5%) [10%] signi¯cant. White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in
parenthesis. Least square dummy variable estimation used in all cases, and non-linear least square
dummy variable estimation used when a growth e®ect of in°ation is parametrized. Subperiod
dummies used if jointly signi¯cant. Estimates based on a panel of eight-year averages for the period










































































































Figure 1: Subperiod-average in°ation rate versus residuals for 14 EU countries (1960-
99).
30